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Comment
THE HANDICAPPED CHILD'S RIGHT TO A FREE
APPROPRIATE EDUCATION: DEFINING
THE LIMITS OF RESPONSIBILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite mandatory school attendance laws,' handicapped children
in America have been to a great extent neglected and ignored with re-
spect to their educational needs. 2 In 1975, Congress determined that
over one half of the eight million handicapped children in the United
States did not receive any educational services, or received services which
were inadequate.3 Congress also found that the burden of caring for the
handicapped fell primarily and heavily on the parents and families of
these children. 4
1. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-401 (1981). This section provides in relevant
part:
Every parent, guardian, or other person residing permanently or
temporarily in the District of Columbia who has the custody or con-
trol of a child between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause said
child to be regularly instructed in a public school or in a private or
parochial school or instructed privately during the period of each year
in which the public schools of the District of Columbia are in session:
Provided, That instruction given in such private or parochial school,
or privately, is deemed equivalent by the Board of Education to the
instruction given in the public school.
Id. See also COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-33-104 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
76, § 1 (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120, 10 (1960); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-25 (West 1968); N.Y. EDUC. LAws § 3205 (McKinney 1981). Moreover,
§ 31-207 makes the failure to instruct a child between the requisite ages a
punishable offense. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-207 (1981). However, § 31-403 pro-
vides that a child may be excused from attendance if the child is found to be
"unable mentally or physically to profit from attendance at school." Id. § 31-403.
2. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L No. 94-
142, §§ 3(b)(1), (3), 89 Stat. (1975) (Statement of Findings and Purpose). As
defined by the Haidicapped Act, the term "handicapped children" means
"mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handi-
capped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other
health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who
by reason thereof require special education and related services." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1976 &c Supp. IV 1980).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Congress determined that 1.74
million handicapped children never received any public education, and that
2.25 million children were receiving inadequate educational services. S. REP.
No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425, 1432 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 108]. See also 121 CONG. REC.
S19,487-92 (1975).
4. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
142, § 3(b)(6). 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
(567)
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In an attempt to aid the handicapped in attaining self-sufficiency, 5
and to equalize educational opportunity available to the handicapped,"
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 (Act).7 Under this seminal legislation, the federal government is
committed to provide funding to help states and localities S educate
handicapped children.9 To qualify for federal funding10 state educa-
tion agencies have the responsibility of insuring that all handicapped
children are identified,1' granted due process,12 and provided with a
5. See Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The Arm-
strong court recognized that the Act was designed to allow handicapped chil-
dren to achieve equal educational opportunity, and to achieve "at a minimum"
self-sufficiency and independence. Id. at 603. The court further noted that
one of the Act's principal proponents observed that a failure to provide an
appropriate education to the handicapped resulted in public agencies and tax-
payers "'spending billions of dollars'" to maintain these individuals as de-
pendents. Id. at 604, quoting 121 CONG. REC. S19,492 (1975).
6. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
7. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1461 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
8. See id. §§ 1411-1412. The Act provides that in determining the allot-
ment of federal funds to be disbursed to each state, the Commissioner may not
count "to the extent the number of such children is greater than 12 per
centum of the number of all children aged five to seventeen, inclusive, in
such State." Id. § 1411(a)(5)(A)(i). Hence, a state will have little incentive
to inflate the number of children identified as handicapped. See Comment,
The Education For All Handicapped Children Act: Opening the Schoolhouse
Door, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 43 (1976). Despite additional federal
funding provided to the states, it has been observed that the federal funds
are not to be utilized to mitigate the local educational agencies obligations
under the Act; instead "[i]t is expected that necessary arrangements to achieve
this goal will be made by the local educational agencies." S. REP. No. 168,
supra note 3, at 15. Additionally, Congress recognized that this burden would
not be a light one because it costs approximately twice as much to educate a
handicapped child as it does to educate a student who does not require special
education. Id. Accordingly, 75% of all federal funds received by the state
educational agency will be redistributed to the local educational agencies. 20
U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
9. For a discussion of the Act's specific requirements for the education
of handicapped children, see notes 16-19 and accompanying text infra.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The receipt of federal
monies is conditioned entirely on the state's compliance with the require-
ments of the Act. Id. For a discussion of these requirements, see notes 11-18
and accompanying text infra. Additionally, the state must submit for ap-
proval a plan detailing the steps to be taken to bring the state into full com-
pliance with the eligibility requirements contained in § 1412. 20 U.S.C. § 1413
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
11. U.S.C. § 1412(2)(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This section provides
in pertinent part:
In order to qualify for assistance under this subchapter in any fiscal
year, a state shall demonstrate to the Commissioner that the following
conditions are met:
(C) all children residing in the State who are handicapped, regard-
less of the severity of their handicap, and who are in need of special
education and related services are identified, located, and evaluated,
[VOL. 27: p. 567
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"free appropriate public education" 13 in the "least restrictive environ-
ment" 14 in accordance with the state agencies' individualized educa-
tional program. 15
and that a practical method is developed and implemented to determine
which children are currently receiving needed special education and
related services and which children are not currendy receiving special
education and related services ....
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in identifi-
cation and evaluation of handicapped children, see Comment, supra note 8,
at 54.
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1975 & Supp. V 1980). For a discussion of the pro-
cedural safeguards required under the Act, and their effect, see Note, Enforc-
ing the Right 'to An "Appropriate" Education: the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARy. L. REv. 1103, 1108-11 (1979). The
Act provides that any local educational agency and intermediate educational
unit that receives funds under the Act shall, among other procedural safe-
guards, fully inform the child's parents of any change or refusal to change
the child's program, and provide an opportunity for the child's parents to
present complaints with respect to placement or identification of their child.
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976 & Supp. 1V 1980). Section 1412 (1) states
that one requirement for federal aid is that "[t]he state has in effect a policy
that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public
education". Id. The term free appropriate education is statutorily defined
as
special education and related services which (A) have been provided
at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C)
include an appropriate pre-school, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required under Section
1414(a)(5) of this title.
Id. § 1401(18).
14. See id. § 1412(5)(B). This section provides that handicapped chil-
dren be educated whenever possible with nonhandicapped children. Id. Thus,
the right to an education in the least restrictive environment is insured by
requiring local educational agencies to provide a continuum of alternative
placement from regular classes to institutionalization. See id.; 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.551 (1981). However, all placement decisions must be made in light
of the Act's mandate to provide an education in the least restrictive environ-
ment. See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978), citing
45 C.F.R. § 121a.553(a)(4) (1981). See generally Comment, The Least Restric-
tive Environment Section of the Education for All Handicapped Children's
Act of 1975: A Legislative History and an Analysis, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 717
(1978).
15. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The individualized
educational programs must be established in accordance with § 1414(a)(5).
Id. § 1412(4). The term individualized educational program is defined as
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any
meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an inter-
mediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or super-
vise the provisions of, specially designed instruction to meet the
unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or
guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which
statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educa-
tional performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals,
including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the
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"Free appropriate public education" has been construed to em-
body an entire range of procedural and substantive rights.' The
phrase "least restrictive environment" has been narrowly interpreted to
refer solely to the placement of children. 17 Although "least restrictive
environment" indicates a congressional preference for "mainstreaming"
of the handicapped,i8 the restrictiveness of a given environment will
not be addressed once a court has determined that a residential place-
ment is the only viable one for the child.'9
This comment will examine the judicial and statutory antecedents
to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, and focus
on the various constructions of the "free appropriate education" require-
ment, both in the classroom and residential settings. It will then address
the questions surrounding the availability of judicial enforcement of the
right to a free appropriate education. Finally, this comment will sug-
gest a mode of analysis for cases arising under the legislation.
specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the ex-
tent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educa-
tional programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated
duration of such services, (E) appropriate objective criteria and evalu-
ation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual
basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
Id. § 1401(19). It has been observed that the individualized educational
program is the "cornerstone of the free appropriate public education." Com-
ment, supra note 14, at 730.
16. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1224-28, 1291 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (outlining the various requirements of the Act, both substantive and
procedural), vacated 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
17. See, e.g., Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (D. Conn. 1978)
(the right of handicapped children to an education in the "least restrictive
environment is implemented by requiring schools to maintain a continuum
of alternative placements).
18. Mainstreaming involves the integration of handicapped individuals
into programs available for nonhandicapped individuals. American Public
Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See generally
J. Bies, The Impact of Federal Legislation on Special Needs Education, in
HANDBOOK OF SPECIAL EDUCATION VOCATION NEED EDUCATION, 10-12 (J. Meers
ed. 1980); Comment, supra note 14, at 740. Mainstreaming has been defined
as "a belief which involves an educational placement procedure and process
for exceptional children, based on a conviction that each such child should
be educated in the least restrictive environment in which his educational and
related needs can be satisfactorily provided." J. Bies, supra, at 10-17, quoting
Council for Exceptional Children, Statement adopted by 13th Delegate As-
sembly, Delegate Assembly Final Report (Chicago, Ill. April, 1976), p. 6. The
rationale underlying mainstreaming is that, despite differences, exceptional and
handicapped children can have their needs met in the mainstream of society.
J. Bies, supra, at 11. For a discussion of the concept of mainstreaming from
the educators perspective, see R. Anderson, D. Martiney, H. Rich, Perspectivesfor Change, in IMPLEMENTING LEARNING IN THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRON-
MENT: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN THE MAINSTREAM (Schifani, Anderson and
Odle ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as R. Anderson]; Bies, supra, at 10-12.
19. See Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695 (2d
Cir. (1981), citing Dewalt v. Burkeholdt, 3 EHLR 551, 500 (E.D. Va. March 13,
1980).
[VOL. 27: p. 567
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II. BACKGROUND
"The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover the cutting of fallopian tubes . . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough." 20
One commentator has noted that from the beginnings of western
civilization 21 the handicapped have been victims of attitudes such as
that reflected in Justice Holmes' famous statement 22 in Buck v. Bell.23
It has been observed that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
"the causes of deviant behavior were increasingly believed to be the in-
fluence of Satan himself." 24 Eventually, a few states enacted laws creat-
ing special classes for the handicapped premised on the idea that the
handicapped were unable to cope with the ordinary academic cur-
riculum.235 Nevertheless, prior to 1971, only seven states required edu-
cation for the handicapped.2 6 However, in the 1970's, two seminal cases
radically changed American law in the area of education of the
handicapped. 27
20. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926).
21. R. Anderson, supra note 18, at 11-12, quoting S. KIRK & J. GALLAGHER,
EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (3d ed. 1979). In the pre-Christian era
handicapped children were neglected and ignored. R. Anderson, supra note
18, at 12.
22. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926). See also Burgdorf & Burg-
dorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead, Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of
Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995 (1977). It has been noted:
If a person is judged incompetent by reason of mental disability, this
has significant repercussions for him as an individual. Twenty-seven
states have steriliziation laws applicable to the mentally retarded, 37
states prohibit marriage of persons designated variously as 'idiots',
'imbeciles,' and 'feebleminded', and eight states permit the annulment
of an adoption if the child is subsequently found to be 'feebleminded'.
K. LONG, JOHNNY'S SUCH A BRIGHT Boy, WHAT A SHAME HE's RETARDED, 265
(1973). See Comment, supra note 14, at 743. The mentally retarded were
subject to the same treatment as the insane. Id. Further, if the retarded were
not institutionalized, they were often left to wander. Id. at 744.
23. In Buck, the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia law providing for sexual
sterilization of inmates of institutions, who, as determined by the superin-
tendent of certain institutions, were suffering from a hereditary form of "in-
sanity and imbecility." 274 U.S. at 206.
24. R. Anderson, supra note 18, at 12.
25. Id. School professionals believed that the handicapped would progress
faster if removed from social and academic pressure. Id.
26. Comment, supra note 14, at 746. See also S. REP. No. 168, supra note
3, at 20-21 (table of the statutes of state law in 1975); Handel, The Role of the
Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Minimal
Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J., 349, 351-54 (1975).
27. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania,
334 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). For a discussion of
PARC, see notes 28-38 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Mills,
1981-82]
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A. Judicial Decisions Antedating the Act
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsyl-
vania 2s (PARC), the plaintiffs instituted a class action on behalf of
mentally retarded children who had been excluded from public school
systems as uneducable. 20  The plaintiffs contended that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 30 requires that all chil-
dren of school age have the right to a public education, regardless of any
handicaps they may have.3 ' A three judge district court panel approved
see notes 39-45 and accompanying text infra. More than seventy lawsuits relat-
ing to handicapped children were filed in over thirty-five states between 1969
and 1975. K. LONG, supra note 22, at 265. See also Note, Failure to Provide
Education to Physically or Emotionally Handicapped Children, 52 B.U.L. REV.
884 (1972).
28. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
29. 334 F. Supp. at 1259. PARC brought suit on behalf of two classes
of residents at Pennhurst State School and Hospital: educable and "retarded
trainable residents who were receiving inadequate educational services; and
"uneducable" residents who were receiving no instruction. Id. at 282. The
students were the responsibility of the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (Purdons 1977).
30. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No state
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws." See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 991-94 (1978).
Classifications have historically been subjected to three standards of review:
I) strict scrutiny, 2) intermediate-tier and 3) rationality. Id. at 994-1004.
Strict scrutiny is triggered by classifications either impacting on fundamental
rights or "suggesting prejudice against racial or other minorities." Id. at
1000. The intermediate-tier of review has been utilized to scrutinize gender
based legislation and legislation dealing with illegitimacy. Id. at 1063. Ad-
ditionally, equal protection at a minimum requires a rational relationship be-
tween the legislative means and ends. Id. at 995.
For decisions utilizing the various standards of review, see, e.g., In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (alienage, strict scrutiny); New Jersey Welfare
Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (illegitimacy, strict scrutiny); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (national origin, strict scrutiny); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race, strict scrutiny); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel interstate, strict scrutiny); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote, strict scrutiny); Sherbert v.
Yerner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of religion, strict scrutiny); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a criminal appeal, strict scrutiny);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 618 (1954) (race, strict scrutiny); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national origin, strict scrutiny);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (prohibition against institution of wrong-
ful death actions by fathers but not mothers of illegitimate children, inter-
mediate-tier); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (life-
time preference for veterans, intermediate-tier); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (gender, intermediate-tier); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School
Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school finance, rationality); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1971) (welfare legislation, rationality). See generally Bice,
Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (1977).
31. 343 F. Supp. at 282-83. At the time of the PARC decision, the public
school systems were not obligated under Pennsylvania law to allow children
who were certified by a school psychologist as uneducable or untrainable to
[VOL. 27: p. 567
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss3/4
COMMENT
a consent decree entered into by the parties which stated that all
children are capable of benefiting from education. 2 The court, pre-
sented with a challenge to its jurisdiction,33 determined that the plain-
tiffs established a colorable claim that the state lacked a rational basis
for excluding the plaintiffs from the public education system. 34 Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that prior to any act which excludes chil-
dren from the public school systems, the state must provide full hearings
to insure that the requirements of due process have been met.35 The
PARC court approved the requirement that the state insure an educa-
tion for all handicapped children by providing a periodic review of the
handicapped child's progress,3 6 a program for financing the training
enroll in the public school systems. See PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1375 (Purdons
1977).
32. 334 F. Supp. at 1259. The court noted in the consent decree that
expert testimony demonstrated that the majority of handicapped children
were capable of benefiting from education to the extent that they would be
able to achieve self-sufficiency, while the remaining few would nevertheless
benefit to some degree from public education. Id. It should be noted that
this notion directly contravened the generally accepted idea that the handi-
capped were incapable of benefiting from public education. Compare id.
with notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the court noted
that experts unanimously supported the proposition that all handicapped chil-
dren can benefit from education. 343 F. Supp. at 296.
33. 343 F. Supp. at 290-99. One defendant sought to upset the agreement
entered into by the litigants by contesting the court's jurisdiction rather than
the fairness of the settlement. Id. at 290.
34. Id. at 283 n.8. In determining that a colorable claim existed, the court
noted that once the state provides education, substantial support indicates that
education is a fundamental right, and therefore, the state is required to demon-
strate a compelling state interest before it can exclude a class of students from
the schools. Id. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 603 (1966); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954). However, the
court noted that exclusion in PARC would be deemed unconstitutional even
under the "less stringent" rational basis test. 343 F. Supp. at 283 n.8. For a
discussion of the various levels of scrutiny under equal protection analysis, see
note 30 supra.
35. 343 F. Supp. at 293-95, 303-06. The fifth amendment provides that
the federal government shall not deprive any person of "life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the four-
teenth amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of "life,
liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The strand of due process analysis designated as procedural due process "has
traditionally involved the elaboration of procedural safeguards designed to
accord to the individual '[t]he right to be heard before being condemned to
suffer grievous loss of any kind' ....... L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 502 quoting
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
For cases dealing with the requirement of a hearing, see Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961).
36. 343 F. Supp. at 284-85, 288.
1981-82]
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teachers,37 and, in cases where public education is inappropriate, place-
ment of the handicapped child in a private facility at state expense.38
One year after PARC was decided, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia handed down its decision in Mills v. Board
of Education.3 9 Mills was an action brought by the parents or guardians
of seven children who had been excluded from the District of Columbia
public schools. 40 The plaintiffs contended that the District of Columbia
Board of Education should be required to provide specialized classes
for children who were mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or
hyperactive. 41 The Mills court held that, in view of the fact that a
statute required mandatory school attendance for all children between
the ages of seven and sixteen,42 the exclusion of handicapped children
constituted a violation of the fifth amendment's due process clause.43
Having determined that the fifth amendment guarantees hand-
icapped children a right to a public education, the court then turned
to the school board's argument that it lacked sufficient funds to educate
handicapped children. 44 In considering this defense, the Mills court
concluded that "[t]he inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public
School System whether occasioned by insufficient funding or adminis-
trative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily
37. Id. at 288.
38. Id. at 311-12. However, the court recognized that public school place-
ment rather than placement in a residential facility is preferable. 334 F. Supp.
at 1260. See also Comment, supra note 14, at 747 & n.163.
39. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
40. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that although the children could benefit
from an education in regular classrooms with supportive services, they were
excluded after being labeled mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or
hyperactive, with no provision for alternative placement or periodic review. Id.
41. Id. at 868-70.
42. Id. at 874. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-401, 31-407 (1981). For the text
of the pertinent provision of the code, see text accompanying note I supra.
43. 348 F. Supp. at 875. The Mills court reasoned that the defendants'
conduct in denying the handicapped and exceptional children "not just an
equal publicly supported education but all publicly supported education" while
providing education for others, violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Id. Further, relying on precedent, the court concluded that due
process requires a hearing prior to placement in a specialized educational pro-
gram in lieu of admission to regular schools. Id. at 874-75, quoting Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Where the state has undertaken to
provide it, [education] is a right which must be made available on equal
terms").
Additionally, the court concluded that in failing to provide specialized
education for all those who need it, the District of Columbia Board of Educa-
tion violated its own regulations and statutes, which require that the Board
make the opportunity for education available to all children between the ages
of seven and sixteen who reside in the District. 348 F. Supp. at 874.
44. 348 F. Supp. at 875-76. The Board attempted to defend its actions on
the ground that the relief requested would be "impossible" unless Congress
appropriated additional funds. Id. at 875.
[VOL. 27: p. 567
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on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than the normal child." 45
Although the precedential value of these two decisions has been
questioned,46 particularly with respect to the constitutional under-
pinnings of their respective holdings,47 PARC and Mills have been inter-
preted as recognizing the handicapped child's right to an appropriate
public education. 48 Moreover, these two cases have served to highlight
the fundamental tenets of this right.49 Additionally, these two decisions
are representative of similar litigation that established the handicapped
child's right to public education in other jurisdictions prior to the
passage of the Handicapped Act.50
Perhaps limiting the impact of PARC and Mills is the 1973 case of
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,51 in which the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the right to receive a public
education was constitutionally guaranteed or a fundamental interest the
restriction of which requires strict judicial scrutiny.52 Arguably how-
45. Id. at 876. The Mills court also stated that if in fact resources were
scarce, then the available funds must be expended equitably so that no class
of children are excluded from the system entirely. Id.
46. See generally Comment, supra note 14, at 748; Note, The Education
of All Handicapped Children's Act of 1975, 10 J. MiciR. L. REF. 110, 113 n.20
(1976); note 47 and accompanying text infra. But see Handel, supra note 26,
at 358 n.46.
47. The criticism stems from weaknesses inherent in the two opinions.
First, PARC was a consent decree; although the court did find a colorable
claim of a denial of equal protection, it did so for jurisdictional purposes. See
343 F. Supp. at 279, 283 n.8; Comment, supra note 14, at 748 n.169; note 33
and accompanying text supra. Secondly, it has been asserted that the Mills
court did not in fact rely on the Constitution for its decision because the
defendant's only defense was lack of funds, a nonconstitutional defense.
Comment, supra note 14, at 749 n.170. Thus, the reference to a due process
violation was dicta. Id. But see note 48 and accompanying text infra.
48. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 6; Haggerty 8c Sacks,
Education of the Handicapped: Toward a Definition of An Appropriate
Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 993 (1977). Congress observed in the legis-
lative history that "these court rulings [PARC and Mills] guarantee the right
to free publicly-supported education for handicapped children." S. REP. No.
168, supra note 3, at 6.
49. The elements of Mills and PARC have been incorporated within the
Handicapped Act. Compare 348 F. Supp. at 866 and 343 F. Supp. 279 with
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976 8c Supp. IV 1980).
Congress recognized, as evidenced in the legislative history, that included
within the right to education for the handicapped was the right to a prior
hearing, periodic review of the child's progress and adequate alternative educa-
tion services, including special education and tuition. S. REP. No. 168, supra
note 3, at 6, 8.
50. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 6-7 ("decisions in more than 36 court
cases in the States have recognized the rights of handicapped children to an
appropriate education").
51. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
52. Id. at 36. In Rodriguez, the Court was faced with an equal protection
challenge to the Texas system of school financing. Id. at 40. The Rodriguez
Court recognized that the right to education is neither explicitly nor implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution, despite the historic importance of education in
9
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ever, despite Rodriguez, a law that excludes handicapped children from
public education is still a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment,5 3 because such a law may nevertheless lack a rational
basis.54
B. Legislative and Statutory History
Prior to 1966, the federal government's efforts regarding education
for the handicapped were aimed primarily at vocational education
assistance programs.55 In fact, as early as 1917 the federal government
was funding vocational education for the handicapped. 56 However, a
major change in the legislative scheme occurred in 1966 when Congress,
in an attempt to centralize efforts to assist the handicapped, created
the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped.5 7 From 1966 to 1974,
the federal government enacted a number of laws dealing with the
education of the handicapped; however, they uniformly failed to estab-
lish a comprehensive role for the federal government in educating the
handicapped, and instead reserved that role for the states.68
the United States. Id. at 35. In so concluding, the Court rejected the proposi-
tion advanced by the appellees that education is necessary to insure the citizens
first amendment rights. Id. In spite of the holding of Rodriguez, it should
be noted that in many states the right to an education is guaranteed under
the state constitution. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359
(1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973).
53. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (finding an equal protection
component in the fifth amendment); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C. 1967) (doctrine of equal protection embraced within the fifth amend-
ment).
54. See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 48; Murdock, Civil Rights of the
Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 133, 166-67
(1972); Note, The Right To An Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 519, 542 n.119. See also Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp.
946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("There may be no rational basis for providing
education to most children and yet denying mentally retarded children in-
struction").
55. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 5; J. Bies, supra note 18, at 38.
In 1963, Congress enacted the Vocational Educational Assistance Act of
1963 for the express purpose of helping the states "to maintain, extend, and
improve existing programs of Vocational Education." Vocational Education
Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-210, 77 Stat. 403 (1963) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 237-239 (1975)).
56. See J. Bies, supra note 18, at 38.
57. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750,
80 Stat. 1191, 1208 (1966). Prior to 1966 the handicapped were not the respon-
sibility of any one particular federal agency.
58. For a thorough discussion of these various laws, see S. REP. No. 168,
supra note 3, at 5-6. ("Rather than providing full support, the Federal Gov-
ernment continued its function as a catalyst to local and state program
growth").
[VOL. 27: p. 567
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Against this backdrop, Congress sought in the mid-1970s to remedy
the problem existing after Mills and PARC-state and federal authorities
lacking the means of effectuating judicially recognized rights for the
handicapped.5 9 An emergency short term measure 60 was enacted by
the federal government to insure that the handicapped received the full
benefits of equal protection, i.e., a full public education. 61 While this
short term law was not as comprehensive as the Handicapped Act, it
did incorporate the principles enunciated in PARC and Mills.62
In light of this history, Congress endeavored in enacting the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 to provide educational
services to the handicapped that would insure equal protection, regard-
less of the lack of financial resources. 63 Implementation of the Act's
mandate, a free appropriate education in the least restrictive environ-
ment, would be achieved through the state educational agencies which
have the primary responsibility of insuring that all of the requirements
of the Act are carried out.64 Further, the federal government insured
state compliance by conditioning the receipt of federal funds upon such
compliance, thereby creating a mechanism of review and evaluation. 65
59. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 1429, 1431. For a discussion of
PARC and Mills, see notes 27-49 and accompanying text supra.
60. Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§611-621, 88 Stat. 484, amended by Pub. L. No.
94-142, 89 Stat. 773, (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1416) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). This measure was adopted by Congress to expedite the "massive federal
assistance" that the states required to provide education for the handicapped.
Comment, supra note 14, at 762. This interim measure established procedural
guarantees for the handicapped and required the states to submit plans de-
tailing the approaches they utilized to achieve the least restrictive environment
for the handicapped child. Id. at 763.
61. For a complete discussion of the legislative history, see Comment,
supra note 14, at 763-67.
62. Id. at 769 (handicapped child should be educated in a regular class-
room environment). In order to improve the existing law, the Handicapped
Act incorporated state eligibility requirements, thereby strengthening the pro-
cedural safeguards. Id. See also notes 27-50 and accompanying text supra.
63. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 1446-47, quoting Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. at 876.
64. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 1448.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (1976 & Supp. V 1980). Section 1416 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Whenever the Commissioner, after reasonable notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing to the State educational agency involved ... finds-
(1) That there has been a failure to comply substantially with
any provision of section 1412 or section 1413 of this title, or
(2) that in the administration of the State plan there is a failure
to comply with any provision of this subschapter or with any re-
quirements set forth in the application of a local educational agency ...
The Commissioner (A) shall, after notifying the State educational
agency, withhold any further payments to the State under this sub-
chapter, and (B) may, after notifying the State educational agency,
withhold further payments to the State under the Federal programs
specified in section 1413 (a)(2) of this title within his jurisdiction,
1981-82]
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However, defining the parameters of the substantive requirement of the
Handicapped Act-a free appropriate public education-were left to the
state educational agencies with disputes to be resolved ultimately by
the judiciary.6
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF A FREE APPROPRIATE EDUCATION
A. The Scope of a Free Appropriate Education
in the Classroom
The term free appropriate education is defined by the Handicapped
Act and the regulations interpreting the Act as special education and
related services.67 However, in Rowley v. Board of Education,6 8 the
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's reformulation of the definition
of free appropriate education: "That each handicapped child be given
an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with the
opportunity provided other children." 69 Applying the foregoing defini-
tion to the facts before it,70 the Rowley court determined that the Hand-
to the extent that funds under such programs are available for the
provision of assistance for the education of handicapped children.
Id.
66. See, e.g., id. § 1401(18)(B) (definition of free appropriate education
must meet the standards of the state educational agency); id. § 1412(2)(B)
(development of state plan and procedure); id. § 1415(e) (2) (allowing an appeal
to the federal courts when the parents or guardians dispute a decision made in
the individualized educational program); S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, 1449-50.
67. See note 13 supra. A "special education" is defined as "specially de-
signed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs
of a handicapped child; including classroom instruction, instruction in physical
education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions."
20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976 & Supp. V 1980). The term "related services" is
defined as follows:
The term 'related services' means transportation, and such develop-
mental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech
pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupa-
tional therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, ex-
cept that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation
purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to
enefit from special education, and includes the early identification
and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.
Id. § 1401(17).
68. 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), appeal pending, 101 S. Ct.
1343 (1981).
69. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), quoting
Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1103, 1125-26
(1979). Writing for the district court, Judge Broderick concluded that the
Handicapped Act does not define what constitutes an appropriate education.
For a discussion of the difference between the full potential test and the statu.
tory definition, see note 77 and accompanying text infra.
70. The Rowley court accepted the district court's determination that
without an interpreter, Amy Rowley could understand only 59% of what tran-
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icapped Act required the School Board to provide a sign language
interpreter to insure that the deaf child have the same opportunity as
other children do to learn in the classroom environment. 7' However,
the Rowley court stated in a caveat that the decision was limited to the
unique facts of the case.72
Judge Mansfield, dissenting, maintained that the district court erro-
neously adopted an impractical definition of a free appropriate educa-
tion 73 because "a free appropriate education" is defined in the Hand-
icapped Act,74 and, because the scope of the right is left primarily to
state formulation subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Educa-
tion for the United States.75 The dissent reasoned that since one of the
state's plan which had been approved by the federal government did not
provide for sign language interpreters, the state should not now be
required to provide one.76 Moreover, Judge Mansfield observed that the
majority's formulation of the definition of free appropriate education is
broader than is necessary to achieve Congress's goal of insuring that
handicapped children become productive and self-sufficient citizens. 77
spired in class; however, with a sign language interpreter, 100% of the class-
room activities would be accessible to her. 632 F.2d at 948. The Rowley
court also recognized that Amy was a "bright child" who demonstrated an
"intense desire" to learn, and received "extraordinary" help from her parents.
Id. at 947.
71. Id. at 948.
72. Id. at 948 & n.7.
73. Id. at 948 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 948-49 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield focused on
the definition of "special education" and "related services" as set forth in the
Act. Id. For the Act's definitions of these terms see note 67 and accompanying
text supra. Additionally, Judge Mansfield looked to the federal definition of
audiology under the Code of Federal Regulations, and concluded that the
foregoing term excluded the possibility of providing a sign language inter-
preter. 632 F.2d at 949 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), citing 45 C.F.R.
§ lla.13 (b) (1981).
75. 632 F.2d at 949, 951 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
The scope and range of an appropriate education is left primarily to
the states, which are given broad authority to prescribe the details
of educational policy in individual cases and must present specific
plans for approval to the United States Commissioner of Education
who, if he finds that a state's plan is not in conformity with the Act
and federal regulations thereunder, may withhold funding, with the
state given the right to appeal to a federal court of appeals.
Id. at 951 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), citing 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (1976 & Supp.
V 1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
76. 632 F.2d at 948-51 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield notes
that a New York state law paralleling the Handicapped Act did not require
that a sign language interpreter be provided for deaf children, and that the
state plan had been approved by the United States Commissioner of Educa-
tion. Id. at 949 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), citing N.Y. EDuc. LAw §§ 4201-4210,
4351-4357, 4401-4409 (McKinney's 1972 & Supp. 1981).
77. 632 F.2d at 952-53 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield noted
that the goal of each child, attaining productivity in society, is a more limited
one than the goal formulated by the majority, which focuses on the child
1981-82]
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In light of this goal, the dissent observed that the child in question did
not require the services of a sign language interpreter because her
academic record indicated that "she will become a productive member
of society." 78
In Tatro v. Texas 9 the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a claim
brought by the parents of a handicapped child alleging that the failure
of the school board to provide clean instrument catheterization (CIC)
for their child denied her a free appropriate education.8 0 After noting
that the district court deviated from a literal reading of the Act, the
Tatro court held that the Handicapped Act required a school board to
provide related services, s ' including, in this case, clean instrument
catheterization.82 The Tatro court reasoned that "[q]uite simply put,
without the provision of CIC, [the child] cannot benefit from the special
education to which she is entitled, for, without CIC, she cannot be
present in the classroom at all." 83 Although it read the term "related
services" expansively, s4 the Fifth Circuit did impose certain limitations,
noting that the life support service must be of the type that a nurse
could administer, it must necessarily be performed during school hours,
and it must be necessary for the child to receive and benefit from an
education.85
Similarly, the Third Circuit recently held in Tokarcik v. Forest
Hills School District 86 that the Handicapped Act requires a school
district to provide clean instrument catheterization for a physically hand-
icapped child.87 In doing so, the court concluded that the concept of
reaching his or her full potential. Id. See notes 68-72 and accompanying text
supra.
78. 632 F.2d at 953 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
79. 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Id. at 558-60. Essentially, the parents contended that because the
individualized educational program did not contain a provision for clean
instrument catheterization, the school district failed to provide a free appro-
priate education. Id. at 560.
81. For the Act's definition of related services, see note 67 and accompany-
ing text supra.
82. 625 F.2d at 563-64. The Tatro court observed that the district court
deviated from the literal meaning of the statute because the Handicapped Act
requires that states provide to the "maximum extent" education for handi-
capped children in a regular classroom setting; thus, a failure to include CIC
within the concept of related services "would completely eviscerate [this]
mandate." Id. at 563.
83. Id. at 562.
84. Id. at 563-64. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
85. 625 F.2d at 562-63.
86. No. 79-0338 (3d Cir. September 8, 1981).
87. Id., slip op. at 25-33 (3d Cir. September 8, 1981). Prior to the court's
conclusion that the Handicapped Act placed the responsibility of providing
CIC on the state, a member of Amber Tokarcik's family went to school each
day to catheterize her. See id., slip op. at 3. Moreover, Amber had no mental
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related services "need not be education specific" but, rather, may
encompass services falling beyond formal education instruction.8 8 The
Tokarcik court formulated the test as whether the CIG was necessary to
assist the child in benefiting from her special education.89 After deter-
mining that the federal regulations supported an affirmative conclusion,90
the court fashioned a limitation on the right to related services. 91 By
recognizing that the services must be performed by the school nurse,
rather than by a doctor, the court reasoned that any major medical aid
must necessarily be excluded from the scope of the Handicapped Act.0 2
In Battle v. Pennsylvania,93 the Third Circuit also considered the
scope of the free appropriate education requirement.94 The Battle
court held that the administrative policy of the state, which limited
instruction for all children to 180 days per year, 5 whether handicapped
or not, prevented proper formulation of educational goals and, thus,
could not be upheld. 96 In support of this conclusion, the Third Circuit
deficiencies, and was mentally normal for her age. Id. The school district
contended that Pennsylvania law did not require school nurses to catheterize
students. Id.
88. Id., slip op. at 27. The school district had contended that the CIC
was not a related service because it was not connected with a special education
program and, therefore, was a medical rather than an educational service. Id.,
slip op. at 25.
89. Id., slip op. at 27.
90. Id. The Tokarcik court explained that the regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Handicapped Act provide that related services include school
health services. Id., citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a) (1981). These services, the
court recognized, are further defined as "services provided by a qualified school
nurse or other qualified person." Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., No. 79-
0338, slip op. at 28 (3d Cir. September 8, 1981), quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.13
(b)(10) (1981).
91. Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., No. 79-0338, slip op. at 28 (3d
Cir. September 8, 1981).
92. Id. The court noted that in this case, the CIC would require no more
than a few minutes per day of the school health professional's time, and no
expenditure of funds. Id.
93. 629 F.2d 269, 279 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1109 (1981).
94. 629 F.2d at 269. Battle was a class action brought by "[a]ll handi-
capped school aged persons who require or who may require a program of
special education and related services in excess of 180 days per year and
the parents or guardians of such persons." Id. at 271, quoting Armstrong v.
Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also Mahoney v. Administrative
School Dist. No. 1, 42 Or. App. 665, 601 P.2d 826 (1979). For a thorough
discussion of Battle, see Note, Refusal to Provide Mentally Handicapped
Children With More Than 180 Days of Education Per Year Violates Right to
Appropriate Education Under the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, 26 VILL. L. REV. 876 (1981).
95. 629 F.2d at 274 8& n.6. The court observed that although the "deriva-
tion" of this policy is unclear, the court's attention has been focused on PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 15-1501 (Purdons 1962), which establishes a 180 day mini-
mum school year. 629 F.2d at 274 n.6
96. 629 F.2d at 276, 281.
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recognized that a "free appropriate education" is largely defined by the
goals set forth in the individualized educational programs. 97 The
Battle court recognized that the judiciary lacked the expertise and
capacity to define the limits of a free appropriate education 98 and, thus,
deferred to the state's formulation of the goals sought to be achieved. 99
B. The Scope of a Free Appropriate Education in a
Residential Environment
Under the Handicapped Act, if mainstreaming 100 is not appropriate
for a particular child, and a residential environment is the only one in
which a child can benefit, the school board and the state have an obliga-
tion to insure a free appropriate education in that setting. 11 This
conclusion and the questions surrounding the scope of the educational
agency's responsibility have sparked considerable controversy.9 2
In Mahoney v. Administrative School District No. 1,103 both the
school district and the handicapped child's parents agreed that a residen-
tial placement of the child in a private facility was necessary. 0 4 How-
ever, a question arose with respect to the hearing officer's authority
to order the state and local district to pay the child's tuition.10' The
Mahoney court noted that a regulation promulgated pursuant to the
Handicapped Act provided that where a residential placement of
the child is necessary, it must be at no cost to the child's parents.'9o
The court therefore concluded that the decision to place a child in a
residential setting automatically triggered the educational agency's ob-
ligation to pay the necessary tuition. 07
In North v. District of Columbia Board of Education,108 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia was confronted with
97. Id. at 281. For a description of the term "individualized educational
programs" see note 15 and accompanying text supra.
98. 629 F.2d at 281.
99. Id.
100. For a discussion of the concept of mainstreaming, see note 18 and
accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra; notes 103-37 and ac-
companying text infra.
102. See notes 103-38 and accompanying text infra.
103. 42 Or. App. 665, 601 P.2d 826 (1979).
104. Id.
105. Id. This question was raised by the school district. Id. at 667, 601
P.2d at 827.
106. Id. at 668, 601 P.2d at 828, citing 45 C.F.R. § 121a.302 (1981). The
regulation provides: "The educational program is to be provided at no cost to
the child's parents or guardians. It follows that here, where private residential
placement has been found necessary, the tuition expense must be borne by the
school district." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.302 (1981).
107. Id. at 668, 601 P.2d at 829.
108. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
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the difficult task of determining the scope of the school board's financial
obligation where the child suffered from physical and emotional prob-
lems, as well as learning problems. 0 9 In North, the parents of a multi-
handicapped child sought to have the Board of Education place the
child in a residential program where he would receive suitable support
services.110 The Board of Education contended that it was not ob-
ligated to pay the costs of residential placement because of the child's
many social, emotional, and noneducational problems, and that, there-
fore, the Department of Human Services should be required to pay
the full costs of placement."' In attempting to assign the financial
responsibility to the appropriate agency, the North court observed:
It may be possible in some situations to ascertain and de-
termine whether the social, emotional, medical, or educational
problems are dominant and to assign responsibility for place-
ment and treatment to the agency operating in the area of that
problem. In this case, all of these needs are so intimately inter-
twined that realistically it is not possible for the Court to
perform the Solomon-like task of separating them. 112
Moreover, the North court observed that a neglect proceeding which
would have made the child the responsibility of the Department of
Human Services was a "perilous path", and, therefore, determined that
resort to the Handicapped Act was the only viable alternative.118 Hence,
despite the handicapped child's noneducation related handicaps, the
North court ordered the defendants to fund the residential placement." 4
In Kruelle v. New Castle County School District 115 the Third Cir-
cuit similarly was confronted with the questions of whether a hand-
icapped child was entitled to residential placement under the Hand-
icapped Act and, if so, whether the school district was responsible for
109. Id. at 138-39. Ty Wesley North was diagnosed as being an epileptic
with grand mal, petit mal, and drop seizures. Id. In addition he was emo-
tionally disturbed, and learning disabled. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 139.
112. Id. at 141. The North court stated that it is unfortunate that the
judiciary must be involved in what are "essentially . . . internal bureaucratic
disputes." Id. For other expressions of judicial reluctance, see notes 72
98-99 and accompanying text supra.
113. 471 F. Supp. at 140-41. The North court observed that a neglect
proceeding would exacerbate Ty North's emotional problems. Id. The court
recognized that in many situations it might be preferable for the social service
agencies, rather than the school authority, to assume the ultimate responsibility
for the child. Id. at 141. However, the North court concluded that where a
neglect proceeding would result in increased emotional problems, philosophical
and federalism concerns are overcome by "explicit" federal law i.e., the Handi-
capped Act. Id. at 140.
114. Id. at 142.
115. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
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providing a free appropriate education in that setting."16 The district
court had concluded that the child required twenty-four hour a day care
in a residential environment."17 Observing that defining the details and
the scope of an appropriate education is theoretically left for the states,
the Kruelle court stated that the statutory terms "special education" and
"related services", and the regulations adopted pursuant to the Hand-
icapped Act, mandate that if necessary to accomplish the individual's
educational plan a residential placement must be provided.
1 8
In attempting to determine if residential placement was required,
the Third Circuit examined previous decisions both within and without
the Third Circuit." 9 The court cited Battle for the proposition that a
per se application of a standard deemed appropriate for nonhandicapped
children may not suffice for the handicapped."2° The Kruelle court
noted that the school district had sought to "avoid the thrust of Battle"
by asserting that the residential placement requested by the plaintiffs
was required not for educational purposes, but rather for medical
reasons.' 2 1 In response to the school district's contention, the Kruelle
court analyzed whether the requested residential placement was a re-
sponse to medical, social, or emotional problems that were "segregable
from the learning process." 122 The Kruelle court noted that the North
court had recognized the inextricable nature of the medical and educa-
tional needs of the handicapped. 23 Thus, the court concluded that the
116. Id. at 688. The parents of Paul Kruelle, the handicapped child,
objected to the lack of a residential placement for their son, in addition to
the assignment of Paul to a mixed class of trainable mentally retarded. Id. at
689. However, the district hearing officer rejected the Kruelle's claims, deter-
mining that the services sought were in the nature of parenting rather than
education. Id. at 690.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 690-91.
119. Id. at 692. The Kruelle court observed that most courts faced with
the question have held that a residential placement is required. Id. at 692
n.15, citing Capello v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., No. 79-1106,
3 EHLR 551:500 (D.C. Cir. January 23, 1980); Ladson v. Board of Educ. of
D.C., 615 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Matthews v. Campbell, No. 79-0897-R,
3 EHLR 551:264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979); North v. District of Columbia Bd.
of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
120. 642 F.2d at 693. For a discussion of Battle, see notes 93-99 and
accompanying text supra.
121. 642 F.2d at 639.
122. Id. The court noted: "Where basic self-help and social skills such
as toilet training, dressing, feeding and communication are lacking, formal
education begins at that point." Id., quoting Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d
at 269, 275.
123. 642 F.2d at 639. The court observed that the North court was con-
fronted with the same issue as in Kruelle: whether the placement was due to
emotional reasons and thus the responsibility of the social service agencies, or
whether it was necessary for learning and the responsibility of the education
agencies. Id. at 693-94. For a discussion of North, see notes 108-14 and
accompanying text supra.
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nonseverability of such problems supports the holding that such services
are essential for learning.1
2 4
The Third Circuit noted the Fourth Circuit's decision in Tatro,"25
and observed that while Tatro dealt with whether a clean instrument
catheterization was included within the concept of related services, and
Kruelle involved whether a residential placement was included within
the concept of special education, the two questions were similar. 126 The
question in both Tatro and the case before it according to the Kruelle
court was "whether residential placement is part and parcel of a
'specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a
handicapped child.' " 127 In answering this query, the court concluded
that full time care was required in order to meet the unique educational
needs of Paul Kruelle.12 8
Having concluded that the Handicapped Act mandated a residential
placement under the circumstances, the Third Circuit turned to the
task of assessing the responsibility of providing funds for the place-
ment."29 The Kruelle court observed that Congress had unambiguously
provided in the Handicapped Act that the state educational agency
shall be responsible for assuring that the requirements of the law are
carried out. 13 0 Tlhe court further noted that both the regulations
124. 642 F.2d at 694.
125. Id. For a discussion of Tatro, see notes 79-85 and accompanying
text supra.
126. 642 F.2d at 694. The court noted that the lack of a structured en-
vironment contributed to Paul's choking and vomiting which interfered with
his ability to learn. Id. The Kruelle court analogized these facts to the
Tatro case, noting the child in Tatro could not receive the benefits of an
education without CIC. Id.
127. Id., quoting Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d at 563. The Third Circuit
observed that the Act's language required courts to assess "the link between
the supportive service or educational placement and the child's learning needs."
642 F.2d at 694, citing Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d at 563.
128. 642 F.2d at 694. For other cases finding a residential placement
necessary, see notes 103-14 and accompanying text supra; notes 134-37 and
accompanying text infra. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court
that it would be difficult to find a more appropriate case for finding the
necessity of residential placement of a handicapped child. 642 F.2d at 694.
129. 642 F.2d at 695-97.
130. Id., citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Handi-
capped Act provides in pertinent part:
The State educational agency shall be responsible for assuring
that the requirements of this subchapter are carried out and that all
educational programs for handicapped children within the State, in-
cluding all such programs administered by any other State or local
agency, will be under the general supervision of the persons responsi-
ble for educational programs for handicapped children in the State
educational agency and shall meet education standards of the State
educational agency.
1981-821
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adopted pursuant to the Act 131 and the legislative history reflected
Congress's desire to assure that one agency be held ultimately re-
sponsible.1 82 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the State Board
of Education had the final responsibility for coordinating state efforts to
provide for the placement as ordered.13
3
Recently, in William D. v. Shedd 134 the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut was presented with the argument that
since under state law the state educational agency and the local school
boards are not responsible for the noneducational costs of a residential
placement, i.e., costs other than tuition, this law prevented other costs
from being assessed against the agency under the Act. 35  The district
131. 642 F.2d at 697. The Third Circuit focused on the federal regula-
tion which provides:
Responsibility for all educational programs. (a) The State educa-
tional agency is responsible for insuring;
(1) That the requirements of this part are carried out; and
(2) That each educational program for handicapped children admin-
istered within the State, including each program administered by other
public agency;
(i) Is under the general supervision of the persons responsible for
educational programs for handicapped children in the State educa-
tional agency, and
(ii) Meets education standards of the State educational agency (includ-
ing the requirements of this part).
(b) The State must comply with paragraph (a) of this section through
State statute, State regulation, signed agreement between respective
agency officials, or other documents.
45 C.F.R. § 1212.600 (1975).
132. 642 F.2d at 696. The Kruelle court quoted a Senate report which
states that unless the state educational agency is held primarily responsible,
"[t]here is an abdication of responsibility for the education of handicapped
children." Id., quoting S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 24. In looking to
the Act's legislative history, the court also noted that although one agency is
primarily responsible, more than one state agency may provide services. 642
F.2d at 696.
133. 642 F.2d at 697.
134. No. 81-165 (D. Conn. August 7, 1981). For another case resolving
the conflict between state law and the Act, see Papacoda v. Connecticut, No.
80-630 (D. Conn. May 22, 1981).
135. No. 81-165, slip op. at 2. The plaintiff, William D., was diagnosed as
schizophrenic. Id., slip op. at 1. He sought an injunction to compel the de-
fendants, the state educational agency and the local school board, to pay the
full costs of his residential placement, i.e., room and board and the cost of
psychotherapy. Id. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76d(e) (West 1972), which
provides in pertinent part:
(e) Any local or regional board of education which provides special
education pursuant to any mandates in this section shall provide such
transportation, tuition, room and board and other items as are neces-
sary to the provision of such special education except for children
who are placed in a residential facility because of the need for services
other than educational services, in which case the financial responsi-
bility of the school district and payment to such district shall be
limited to the reasonable costs of special education instruction as
defined in the regulations of the state board of education.
Id. (emphasis added).
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court rejected the foregoing contention, holding that the state agencies
interpretation of state law was in conflict with federal law by undermin-
ing the Handicapped Act which provides that all components of an
appropriate education in a residential environment must be provided
at no cost to the child's parents. 8 6 The William D. court concluded
that state law cannot be utilized by the state agencies to avoid their
responsibility under the Handicapped Act of funding the appropriate
services for the handicapped.8 7
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO A
FREE APPROPRIATE EDUCATION
While the Handicapped Act established and refined the substantive
and procedural rights of the handicapped to an appropriate public
education, it provides further that the parents or guardians of the hand-
icapped may bring suit in federal court to enforce the Act's guarantees
and to obtain whatever other relief the court deems appropriate. 38
However, prior to bringing suit, one must generally exhaust state ad-
ministrative remedies, unless such efforts would prove futile.139 When
a federal court action is instituted, the litigants must be concerned with
the two initial questions which are still unresolved surrounding an
implied right to damages and the appropriate limitation period.
136. No. 81-165, slip op. at 9, 10. The William D. court applied what it
perceived to be the test under Kruelle, "whether the placement and the services
associated with it are necessary to 'render [the child] educable.' " Id.
137. Id., slip op. at 15. The defendants sought to have state law inter-
preted in a manner that would "limit the responsibility of both the state and
the local school districts to pay for the related services." Id.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1975). This section provides in pertinent part:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under sub-
section (b) of this section who does not have the right to an appeal
under subsection (c) to this section, and any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision under subsection (c) of this section, shall have
the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint pre-
sented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any
State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court in any
State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the
United States without regard to the amount of controversy. In any
action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records
of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at
the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance
of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
139. Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (D. Conn. 1979).
Normally the administrative procedures constitute the hearings required by the
Handicapped Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). However,
these hearings are designed primarily for rendering placement decisions and
for resolving disputes regarding educational programs. Id. One example of
futility is where the state hearing procedure cannot grant the remedy sought.
For example, when a party seeks damages. See 470 F. Supp. at 113.
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A. An Implied Right to Damages
In Loughran v. Flanders,140 the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut was faced with the question of whether there
exists an implied cause of action for damages under the Handicapped
Act.141 Analyzing the question in light of Cort v. Ash,142 the district
court concluded that the legislative histories of both the interim act and
the Handicapped Act "[s]hare a . . . common trait; each is devoid of
even the slightest suggestion that Congress intended for it to serve as a
private vehicle [for] . . . a private cause of action for damages." 143
Accordingly, the Loughran court held that there is no implied cause
of action for damages under the Handicapped Act.144
In contrast to the Loughran court's holding is the case of Boxall v.
Sequiora Union High School District.145 After conceding that the
Handicapped Act does not make it clear whether or not there is an
implied right to damages,' 46 the Boxall court observed that the legis-
lative history indicated that "when appropriate, compensatory damages
may be awarded." 147
140. 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979).
141. Id. at 113-15.
142. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Supreme Court in Cort articulated a four
part test for implying private rights of action in an otherwise silent federal
statutory scheme. rd. at 78. The four prongs of the Cort test are: 1) the
plaintiff must be one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted;
2) there must be an indication of a legislative intent to create such a remedy
or to deny one; 3) such a remedy must be consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme; and 4) the implied cause of action must
not be one traditionally relegated to state law. Id. For cases reformulating
the Cort factors, see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11 (1979); Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). For a discussion of the foregoing
analysis, see Comment, The Implication Doctrine After Touche Ross and
Transamerica: The State of Implied Causes of Action in Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 26 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1981).
143. 470 F. Supp. at 114.
144. Id. at 115. The Loughran court noted that a claim for damages
hinged "upon questions of methodology and educational priorities, issues not
appropriate for resolution by this Court, since they present a 'myriad of in-
tractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems.'" Id., quoting
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 142 (1972), quoting
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
145. 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979). The child, David Boxall, was
diagnosed as autistic. Id. at 1106-07. The child's father rejected school dis-
trict recommendations and secured his own tutor. Id. Subsequently, Mr.
Boxall brought suit to recover the expenses he incurred in educating his son.
Id.
146. Id. at 1112. However, the Boxall court concluded that the confer-
ence committee report indicated that no limitation on damages was intended.
Id.
147. id.
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The Seventh Circuit in Anderson v. Thompson 148 adopted a posi-
tion which falls somewhere between the extremes of the Loughran and
Boxall decisions. The Anderson court, relying upon Loughran, held
that a private right of action for damages did not exist under the
Handicapped Act.149 However, the Anderson court did fashion two
exceptions to the foregoing rule.150 First, where a child's health would
be endangered by a failure of the school system to provide adequate
services, the parents may make alternative arrangements and subse-
quently recover the costs of obtaining the required services. 151 Also,
the Anderson court concluded that where a school district was acting
in bad faith, and the parents unilaterally arranged for educational
services to be provided, the parents could recover the costs of providing
those services.'5 2
B. The Relevant Statute of Limitations
The Handicapped Act does not contain an express statute of limi-
tations, perforce, leaving the question for judicial resolution. The
educational agency in Tokarcik 153 contended that the applicable limita-
tions period was the thirty day period for appeals from administrative
actions. In response, the Third Circuit declared that it would be
difficult to analogize the cause of action created by the Handicapped
Act to a state administrative cause of action.'54 The court recognized
that where state limitations law conflicts with the federal procedural
safeguards incorporated within the Handicapped Act, the federal con-
cerns take precedence over state law.' 5 5 In light of the objectives of the
148. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981). Monica Anderson, the daughter of the
plaintiffs, was diagnosed as having exceptional educational needs. Id. at
1206-07. Her parents refused to comply with the educational agency's recom-
mended educational placement and, instead, placed her in a private school of
their choice. Id.
149. Id. at 1212. In addition to relying on Loughran, the Anderson court
analyzed the legislative history and concluded "that Congress did not envision
appropriate relief generally to include a damage remedy." Id. at 1210-11.
150. Id. at 1213-14. See notes 151 & 152 and accompanying text infra.
151. 658 F.2d at 1213-14, citing Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.
Texas 1981). The Anderson court noted that if the child's parents in Tatro
had not made alternative arrangements, the child's health would have been
impaired. 658 F.2d at 1213-14.
152. 658 F.2d at 1214. The Anderson court concluded, however, that the
damages do not include tort recovery. Id. at 1213 n.12.
153. For a discussion of Tokarcik, see notes 86-92 and accompanying text
supra.
154. No. 79-0338, slip op. at 15. Whenever Congress is silent as to the
limitations period for a federal cause of action, the federal courts determine
which state statute is to be utilized by characterizing the federal cause of action
as analogous to an existing state cause of action, and applying the appropriate
limitations period for the state action. Id., slip op. at 10.
155. Id., slip op. at 23, citing U.A.W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Co., 383 U.S.
696 (1966). For another case dealing with the statute of limitations question,
1981-821
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Act and the fact that Congress provided for a trial de novo,156 the
Tokarcik court held that the suggested thirty day state appeals statute
for administrative appeals was inapplicable to the Handicapped Act.15 7
The court went on to conclude that the Pennsylvania two-year statute
of limitations for the wrongful act or negligence of another was the
most analogous, 158 noting however, that it was not necessary for the
court to decide the question at that time.1 9
V. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
The enactment of the Handicapped Act has resulted in a significant
and systematic employment of resources to insure handicapped children
a better public education than was available prior to the passage of
the Act. 60 Judicial decisions interpreting the Handicapped Act have
implemented the goals of the Act, and also have been consistent with,
and at times have gone beyond the requirements established in PARC
and Mills.'6 ' In doing so, courts have construed the goal of equal
educational opportunity in a way that focuses on the attainment of an
appropriate education regardless of the availability of public financial
resources. 62 But public funds are not inexhaustable and the courts
must address the problem of limited public resources or the laudable
goals of the Act may well be sacrificed in a budget tightening backlash.
A. Limitations on the Right to a Free Appropriate Education
Focusing on the two aspects of an appropriate education, special
education and related services, courts have expressed a reluctance, as
see Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Neb. 1980), aff'd in part,
vacated in part and remanded, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981).
156. No. 79-0338, slip op. 15. The Tokarcik court noted that "Congress
clearly contemplated more than the customary appeal from an administrative
decision." Id. (citations omitted). The court recognized that because suit
under the Handicapped Act is "indistinguishable" from a civil action where
issues are tried de novo, the limitations period for administrative actions is
neither "an analogous nor appropriate reference point." Id. (citations omitted).
157. No. 79-0338, slip op. at 23.
158. Id., slip op. at 24.
159. Id.
160. See notes 1-15 & 55-66 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 28-54 and accompanying text supra. That is particularly
significant in view of the fact that doubt has been cast on the constitutional
underpinnings of PARC and Mills. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text
supra.
162. See Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 494 F. Supp. 266, 272 (W.D.
Ark. 1980) (the Handicapped Act "does not require a State, through its local
educational district, to provide each handicapped child with the best education
for him; it requires a free, appropriate education"); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456
F. Supp. 1211, 1292 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Central York School Dist. v. Commonwealth
Dept. of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 383, 399 A.2d 167 (1979) (providing special
education is a condition precedent to the grant of funds).
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evidenced by the Rowley 163 and Battle '4 decisions to interpret the
Handicapped Act in a way which sets specific limitations on the educa-
tional agencies' obligations. While the Handicapped Act itself does not
provide explicit limitations within its definition of an appropriate edu-
cation,165 there has not been one case in which a court has determined
that the requested service was not included in the definition of an
appropriate education.
Although the courts have not denied services, they have, albeit
vaguely, articulated standards to decide which services fall within the
definition of an appropriate education. It has been held that the
adequacy of special education is determined without reference to what
is appropriate for nonhandicapped students. 66 Similarly, with respect
to related services, the inquiry is whether the services are necessary for
the child to benefit from education. 1 7 This standard, the "benefit from
education" test, is open-ended and vague, and provides little principled
guidance for state educational agencies seeking to determine whether
the particular service is within the definition of appropriate education.108
However, even this standard is more appropriate than the "full poten-
tial" test adopted by the Rowley court which seems to ignore the stat-
utory definition altogether.169
Having formulated the benefit from education standard,170 the
courts have attempted to place restrictions on this test in certain situa-
tions. For example, the Tatro and Tokarcik courts recognized that life
support services must be of the type that could be performed by school
personnel during school hours in order to be within the Handicapped
163. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 98 & 99 and accompanying text supra.
165. The definition of related services lists a number of types of services
included within that term. See note 67 and accompanying text supra. Courts,
however, have not deemed that list exhaustive. See, e.g., Rowley v. Board of
Educ., 632 F.2d at 945; Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d at 562; Tokarcik v. Forest
Hills School Dist., No. 79-0338, slip op. at 25.
166. See, e.g., Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist. No. 79-0338, slip op.
at 25 (clean instrument catheterization); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d
at 845 (sign language interpreter); Battle v. Commonwealth, 629 F.2d at 269(administrative policy setting 180 day limit on school year not compatible with
Handicapped Act).
167. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
168. In fact, it is submitted that a board of education will in many in-
stances have to litigate the question in order to determine whether the service
is within the concept of an appropriate education.
169. See text accompanying note 69 supra. It is submitted that the pur-
pose underlying the Handicapped Act is to aid handicapped children in
obtaining self-sufficiency by equalizing educational opportunity. These goals
differ from a goal that focuses on a child reaching his full potential. It is
arguable that the different goals merely represent differences in degree. Never-
theless they are different standards. For a discussion of this view by the
Rowley dissent see notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 81-85 & 89 and accompanying text supra.
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Act. 71 The formulation of this limitation is not self-evident from the
Handicapped Act or from its legislative and judicial history. 72 How-
ever, there must be limitations on the handicapped child's right to have
services provided by the school board and state educational agencies.
Nonetheless, the foregoing limitations relating to school hours and
school personnel are not practical and also do not provide principled
guidance for educators. 173
It is apparent that state educational agencies have an obligation
under the Handicapped Act to pay the tuition of a handicapped child
who requires an appropriate education in a residential environment,
irrespective of the fact that the residential placement is for other than
educational reasons. 174 While the Handicapped Act mandates that one
agency, the state educational agency, be responsible for providing a free
appropriate education, it does not necessarily follow that where other
than educational disabilities require residential placement another state
governmental body cannot be held primarily responsible for all costs
other than those associated with education, i.e., the cost of tuition. 75
North 176 and Shedd,177 demonstrate that the judiciary, adjudicating on
unfamiliar ground, 178 has concluded that the education agency must
bear the responsibility for all costs. 179 Limitations articulated by the
respective courts in Tatro and Tokarcik would be inapplicable to the
twenty-four hour placement situation because those limitations turn on
the school day and school personnels ° In sum, the judiciary is left in
a quandary: a law without explicit limitations must be applied to
situations far removed from the traditional role of the local educational
agency. The creation of appropriate limitations, thus, involves a conflict
between the traditional role of educators, and an open ended statutory
scheme that seems to suggest that there are few limitations on the hand-
171. See text accompanying notes 85 & 92 supra.
172. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
173. It is submitted that a wooden application of these limitations will
encourage litigation, since the limitations only beg the question of what school
personnel are necessary.
174. See notes 100-37 and accompanying text supra.
175. It is submitted that where the placement obviously has been caused
by factors other than educational needs, the educational agency need only have
the obligation of paying for tuition and such services as are within the concept
of an appropriate education. While the Handicapped Act places the ultimate
responsibility on the state educational agency for assuring a free appropriate
education, that does not mean that it must provide all of the services. Rather,
the Act contemplates a situation where other state agencies must provide the
required services.
176. See notes 108-14 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 134-37 and accompanying text supra.
178. See notes 98 8c 99 and accompanying text supra; Battle v. Pennsyl-
vania, 629 F.2d at 281.
179. See notes 108-14 9- 134-37 and accompanying text supra.
180. See notes 85 & 92 and accompanying text supra.
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icapped child's right to have services and residential placement provided
by the state educational agency.
B. Implied Right to Damages
It has been concluded that ordinarily no implied right to com-
pensatory or punitive damages exists under the Handicapped Act.' 8'
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions that have restricted the
creation of implied rights to damages, it is submitted that the foregoing
conclusion is correct.'8 2  However, it is important to note that the
Anderson court did fashion a sensible health and bad faith exception
to the rule. 8 While it remains to be seen how these exceptions will
be applied, they do not seem to encourage a lack of cooperation on
the part of the parents in formulating the child's educational program
because the child's parents can only recover damages after the fact.
Moreover, the Anderson court's limitations serve the added purpose of
imposing a restraint on administrative neglect. However, in the final
analysis, a school board that in good faith disagrees with the parent of
the handicapped child would be well advised to litigate the question,
since the ultimate sanction under Anderson would be the cost of pro-
viding the disputed services.184
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Handicapped Act has aided the handicapped in attaining
an education, it has failed in the sense that subtle questions under the
Act were left to be decided by a judiciary that lacked the capacity and
the tools to fashion limitations on the rights of the handicapped to have
services provided for them by local educational agencies. 185 Never-
theless, it is hoped that the courts will recognize that there can be an
allocation of certain burdens among the various state agencies premised
on the difference between educationally and noneducationally related
services.' 88 Additionally, the courts should pay greater deference to the
181. See notes 140-44 & 148-52 and accompanying text supra.
182. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979); Touche Ross &c Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). These decisions
have been interpreted as reformulating Cort v. Ash to restrict the implication
of a private right to damages in an otherwise silent statutory scheme. See
generally Comment, supra note 142.
183. See notes 148-52 and accompanying text supra.
184. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
185. See Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d at 948-49 (Mansfield, J., dis-
senting). For another decision referring to the lack of judicial expertise in the
educational area, see note 98 and accompanying text supra.
186. See note 135 and accompanying text supra. The North court, the
first court to recognize the difficulty of separating educational and noneduca-
tional services, observed that it can be done in some cases, and that the in-
extricability of both concepts is the exception rather than the rule. 471 F.
Supp. at 41. Despite the North court's recognition that inextricability is the
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expertise of the state educational agencies in providing substance to the
term free appropriate education. 8 7 With respect to this significant
portion of the Handicapped Act, the judiciary should first compare the
service sought to be included within the definition of free appropriate
education with the actual statutory definition of related services.' 88 If
the service is within the concept as defined by the statute, then the
educational agency would be obligated to provide such service for the
child. It is suggested, however, that if the service is not literally within
the statutory definition of related services, the court should analyze the
question of inclusion as an aspect of the federal common law, and weigh
the service sought, with the goals of equalized educational opportunity
and the attainment of self-sufficiency.' 8 9 Despite the foregoing criticisms,
however, it is submitted that one must conclude that the courts have
followed Congress's admirable mandate and have increased the educa-
tional opportunity available to the handicapped in America.
Richard J. Buturla
exception, the William D. court seemed to elevate the exception to the status
of the rule while ignoring the limiting language in North, William D. v.
Shedd, No. 81-165, slip op. at 10 n.7, 11-12 (D. Conn. August 7, 1981).
187. See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
188. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 114 and 175.
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